| Abergele rail disaster | |
|---|---|
| Details | |
| Date | 20 August 1868 |
| Location | Abergele, Denbighshire |
| Country | Wales |
| Rail line | North Wales Coast Line |
| Cause | Runaway goods wagons |
| Statistics | |
| Trains | 2 |
| Deaths | 33 |
| List of UK rail accidents by year | |
The Abergele rail disaster, which took place near the town of Abergele, on the north coast of Wales in 1868, was, at the time, the worst railway disaster yet in Britain, and also the most alarming. The Railway News said of it [1]
No other collision has ever yet, in this country at least, been attended with such a loss of life, nor presented such horrifying features. The crashing of the engine and carriages into a heap of splinters, each of which wounds unfortunate passengers like a sword, is horrible enough to contemplate; but when fire in its fiercest form is added to the scene, no more frightful occurrence could be imagined.
Contents |
On 20 August 1868, at 7.30 a.m., the London and North Western Railway's down day Irish Mail train left the LNWR's London terminus Euston Station for Holyhead. One of the railway's most powerful engines Prince of Wales[note 1] hauled behind it a chief guard's van, a travelling post office (mail van and tender), a luggage van , four passenger carriages, and a second guards van at the rear of the train. At 11.30 a.m. in Chester, four more passenger carriages were attached immediately behind the front guards van;[2] the train then set off for Holyhead, its next scheduled stop, via the North Wales Coast Line (Chester and Holyhead Railway). At about 12.39 p.m the train passed through Abergele at about 40 miles per hour ( roughly 65 km/h).[2] [note 2] It was about 5 minutes late;[2] by that time, it should have been 5 km further on and passing Llanddulas.[2]
Ahead of it , a 'pick-up' goods train 43 wagons long had left Abergele at 12.15 p.m on the same line; to clear the down line [note 3] for the express, the goods train was to be put into sidings at Llanddulas until the express had passed. At Llanddulas, there were two sidings (Llysfaen sidings),[note 4] serving a lime quarry to the south of the line. When the goods train reached them (about 12.25 pm), both were partly occupied by goods wagons (‘cargo trucks’) and consequently neither siding could take the entire goods train. Under the direction of the Llanddulas stationmaster, therefore, the brake van and last six wagons of the goods train were uncoupled and left on the main down line (protected by the distant signal for Llanddulas). Rather than simply shunting the rest of the train into one of the sidings and returning for the odd six, a series of 'loose shunting' [note 5] operations were embarked upon intended to put empty wagons (there were 26 in the train) [2] into one of the sidings and accumulate a shorter train of loaded wagons on the main line ready to put into the other siding.
There were two brakesmen on the train; both dismounted to take part in the shunting operations. The wagons were held by the brake van brake only on a 1 in 100 gradient falling towards Abergele. The next set of loaded wagons were 'loose shunted' into the original wagons with such force as to break the brake, and the wagons moved off in the direction of Abergele. The brake van was unoccupied, and nobody managed to catch up with it and get back on board to apply the brake;[note 6] the runaway wagons disappeared out of sight round a curve in the line. The next thought was to take the engine back towards Abergele and retrieve the wagons, but this intention was never acted upon, being overtaken by events.
About 13⁄4 mi (2.8 km) beyond Abergele, Arthur Thompson, the engine driver of the Irish Mail saw some wagons no more than 200 yards in front (the line runs in a cutting and curves away to the right at this point).[note 7] He initially thought the wagons were on the up line, "but immediately afterwards perceived that they were running towards him on the down line on which he was travelling". He shut off steam; the fireman, who had also seen the hazard, applied his brake. "Thompson then prepared to jump off and called to his fireman “For God’s sake Joe, jump ; we can do no more”.[2][note 8] Thompson then jumped; his fireman did not.
The Irish Mail is thought to have been doing 28-30 mph (45–50 km/h) when it hit the wagons, which was probably travelling at 12-15 mph (20–25 km/h) towards it at impact.[2] The force of the collision derailed the engine, its tender and the leading guard's van. The engine ran on about 30 yards and over turned to the left; the tender overturned to the right (and ended up fouling the up line, along which the up Irish Mail was due to pass shortly.[note 9]
However, the heavy loss of life resulting from the accident was caused by the load of the two runaway wagons next to the brake van; they carried 50 wooden barrels holding about 1700 gallons (8000 litres) of paraffin oil. (This was produced at Saltney outside Chester by refining liquids produced by the dry distillation of cannel coal from the Flintshire coalfield, and therefore not quite the same as modern paraffin (kerosene) produced by refining crude oil, but it was intended for much the same uses (lamp oil etc) and had much the same flammability: the Board of Trade report gives its igniting point as 137 Fahrenheit (58 °C).[2])
Some of the barrels broke up in the collision and their contents caught fire: the engine , tender, guard’s van and three front carriages were instantly enveloped in dense smoke and flames, which soon spread to the fourth carriage and the front of the leading post office van. This prevented any immediate attempt to rescue the occupants of the first four carriages, who all died, together with the guard in the front guard’s van and the locomotive fireman.
We were startled by a collision and a shock. [...] I immediately jumped out of the carriage, when a fearful sight met my view. Already the three passenger carriages in front of ours, the vans and the engine were enveloped in dense sheets of flame and smoke, rising fully 20 feet. [...] [I]t was the work of an instant. No words can convey the instantaneous nature of the explosion and conflagration. I had actually got out almost before the shock of the collision was over, and this was the spectacle which already presented itself. Not a sound, not a scream, not a struggle to escape, or a movement of any sort was apparent in the doomed carriages,.[note 10] It was as though an electric flash had at once paralysed and stricken every one of their occupants. So complete was the absence of any presence of living or struggling life in them that [...] it was imagined that the burning carriages were destitute of passengers.[3]
Local farm labourers and quarry workers eventually formed a bucket chain to fetch water from the sea 200 yards away to put out the fire in these carriages; when they did the victims were found to be burnt beyond recognition “charred pieces of flesh and bone”.[2] Three of them were later identified by their personal effects.[note 11] The victims were buried in a mass grave in St Michael's churchyard in Abergele, with the London & North Western Railway Company paying all funeral expenses.
Albert Thompson survived the collision, but died in October the same year. The post office workers in the travelling post office escaped , with some of the mail, but the leading post office van was destroyed by fire . There were no serious injuries, let alone deaths in the carriages behind it, which were successfully detached and saved from the fire. A first-class passenger [note 12] and/or labourers sent by the surviving guard ran to Llanddulas to warn of the accident and the up ‘Irish Mail’ was successfully held there. The surviving passengers resumed their journey at 6 p.m the same day (as did the up ‘Irish Mail’).
At the subsequent inquest, the two brakesmen of the goods train did not give evidence (on legal advice) : the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter against them. The jury also strongly censured the station-master at Llanddulas for allowing shunting when the express was expected imminently, contrary to the LNWR’s rules. The brakesmen were tried for manslaughter at Ruthin assizes the following spring , but acquitted.
The Board of Trade Inspector, Colonel Rich issued his report within a month of the accident. He found that
However , his analysis went beyond that of the inquest jury;[note 13] he considered that these failings did not excuse the LNWR , and to some extent were its responsibility.
So far, the three men are seriously to blame, and their neglect has been the immediate cause of the accident, but men of that class cannot be expected to do their duties well if the railway companies do not give them the most convenient and best appliances, and do not look after them strictly and enforce their own regulations
He then criticised the LNWR on a number of points
He then returned to his previous point about what in modern parlance are ‘safety culture’ and ‘compliance’ issues , but he saw as a simple question of discipline
Lastly, I fear that it is only too true that the rules printed and issued by railway companies to their servants, and which are generally very good, are made principally with the object of being produced when accidents happen from the breach of them, and that the companies systematically allow many of them to be broken daily, without taking the slightest notice of the disobedience
He then gave a number of examples, beginning with one which was undeniably relevant
The breach of the regulation which led to this sad accident (viz. shunting within 10 minutes of the arrival of a passenger train) may be observed constantly at stations.....
Before ending
I must disavow any intention of taking advantage of this sad calamity to be severe on the London and North-Western Railway Company. I believe that their line is one of the best in the country, and that its general management and arrangements are as good, on the whole, as those of any of the other lines. But I desire to take advantage of the attention which this deplorable event will attract to bring before railway companies what I conceive to be the great defect in their systems, and which has led to most of the accidents I have inquired into, viz a want of discipline and the enforcing of obedience to their own rules
Although this was not one of the recommendations of the Board of Trade report, it became the practice for steep inclines to be fitted with runaway catchpoints so that runaway vehicles would be derailed and stopped before they had a chance to collide with following trains. These catchpoints became widespread, and only diminished in numbers when all rolling stock was fitted with continuous automatic brakes in the 1980s.
Not until 1879 was any legislation passed to regulate the carriage of flammable liquids by rail.
My Lords direct me to call the attention of the directors to the concluding recommendation of the inspecting officer as to the desirableness of working the line by means of the electric telegraph.
Rolt op cit page 62further confirmation, if any were needed, of the fact that coroner's inquests, as generally conducted, are singularly ill calculated to ascertain the real causes of railway accidents; but they are supposed to be sometimes serviceable... to the railway companies, in concealing the mismanagement of the Company from the public